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LAWRENCE M. SOLAN
My name is Larry Solan. I am on the faculty here at
Brooklyn Law School and this is the last session of the Sympo-
sium. It is on Indonesia. The sessions so far have dealt with
some very important phenomena. We focused in earlier ses-
sions on the relationship between the growth of global markets
and the concern for human rights.
This session is conceptualized a little differently. Here we
are going to focus on a history, in many ways a sad history, in
Indonesia, and ask what has gone wrong, what has gone right
and perhaps most important how the state of affairs can be
made better. This no doubt is going to get us back to many of
the broader issues about the relationship between global mar-
kets and human rights that we have been talking about all
day.
I have been following the situation in Indonesia since the
early 1980s and I learned very quickly that if you want to
learn anything about what is going on in Indonesia, you have
to turn from the conventional press to the alternative press.
The reason that you learn something there is because they
quote Human Rights Watch and other such organizations that
concern themselves with the terrible costs in human suffering
of political repression in Indonesia. The repression is tied to a
complex set of economic facts. Suharto's exit earlier in 1998
makes this an especially appropriate topic for this Symposium.
We are honored to have here two representatives of Hu-
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man Rights Watch. First we will hear from Sidney Jones who
is the Executive Director of the Asia Division of Human Rights
Watch and also an internationally recognized scholar on Indo-
nesia.
And then Richard Dicker, who is associate counsel of Hu-
man Rights Watch, will speak. Among the various things that
he does is to direct the campaign to enlist the corporate com-
munity as a force for human rights. What could be more rele-
vant here?
Finally we are going to hear from Spencer Waller, who is
Associate Dean of this law school, and is also a distinguished
scholar recognized internationally in areas of international
trade, international business transactions and antitrust. He is
the author of the leading treatise in that area.1
This combination of speakers should enlighten us about
these issues. Embarrassingly, I am the one person who can't
enlighten us about these issues, so I am going to sit down and
listen with enthusiasm first to Sidney Jones.
SIDNEY JONES
Let me just start out by saying that Indonesia is a place
where no clich6 works. You can't say globalization is good, you
can't say globalization is bad, you can't say economic develop-
ment has brought about political liberalization, you can't say
that democratic transition is going to speed up economic recov-
ery.
The place is simply too complex. We are dealing with a
country of 220 million people. This is the country that was
worst hit by far by the Asian economic crisis-which has now
become a global economic crisis-and there are a lot of issues
that arise from the Indonesian case that are worth spelling
out.
Before I turn to the direct impact of the economic crisis,
let me just say a word about globalization. Indonesia was the
darling of the World Bank, it was one of the up and coming
tigers, and it was one of the Asian miracle countries. An oil
rich state and a member of OPEC, it was a place which until
1986 had been almost totally dependent on oil income. But in
1. See JAMEs R. ATWOOD, KINGMAN BREWSTER & SPENCER WEBER WALLER,
ANTITRUST & AMERICAN BusINESs ABROAD (3d ed. 1997).
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1986 there was a collapse of oil prices, and that's the point at
which the economy began diversifying and placing a very
heavy emphasis on labor-intensive, export-oriented industries
such as footwear, garments and textiles.
It was in the mid-1980s that some of the issues associated
with both structural adjustment and globalization became
major issues. But it would be very difficult to argue that the
appearance of labor-intensive industries resulted in a net dete-
rioration on human rights, for two reasons. One is that we
were dealing with a situation that was already so bad with
respect to human rights that globalization did not make it
noticeably worse. There was a very repressive political struc-
ture in place, with a government that used economic develop-
ment as a source of legitimacy. The development policies pur-
sued, however, were very much Jakarta-centric and benefited a
very small political elite. In the name of development, there
was serious despoliation of upland areas and dispossession and
marginalization of indigenous peoples and vulnerable groups in
society more generally. That was happening even before these
labor intensive industries took off. Indonesia was also a coun-
try that had forcibly annexed large swathes of territory, East
Timor being one in 1975 and Irian Jaya, the province that
occupies the western half of the island of New Guinea, being
another.
So when the impact of globalization began to be felt, the
problems that emerged almost paled in comparison with the
other human rights violations that were going on.
Moreover, because at that time there were very strict
controls on virtually all civil liberties including freedom of
association, there was actually a useful aspect to globalization,
because it led to the mobilization of workers. The focus on
labor intensive industries led to the growth of industrial es-
tates with the concentration of large numbers of workers,
sometimes 20,000, sometimes 30,000, in one place. Many of
them were women. Because they were all working in one place,
they had the chance to talk to one another about the kinds of
problems that they were facing, the kinds of grievances they
had over low wages, and in some cases, over sexual harass-
ment. For the most part, the conditions were not as bad as
sweatshops, but there were serious violations of internationally
recognized labor rights taking place.
That kind of concentration gave real life to a labor move-
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ment in Indonesia, and workers became a force for trying to
press at the edges, to try and increase freedom of association.
Labor problems were far more visible in these export indus-
tries and industrial estates than they were in the largely rural
areas from which the women workers came.
Another issue affecting Indonesia that related to globaliza-
tion was the kind of labor migration that began to take place
in the region in the mid-1980s. There was a huge export of
workers around the region, and if Indonesians went to Malay-
sia to work, Malaysians went to Korea, and if Burmese went to
Thailand to work, Thais went to Japan. The movement was
always to the country that was one step up on the economic
scale. (One of the interesting phenomena that relates to wom-
en was that as more and more Malaysian and Korean women
entered the labor force they wanted more and more women to
work as maids in their households, so that Indonesia became
one of the biggest exporters of women as maids to other places
in Asia).
There was also a major out-migration of men for construc-
tion and agricultural labor, again particularly to Malaysia, but
to elsewhere as well. In some cases, the departure of male
migrants left a social structure behind that served to empower
women, and there were some fascinating social changes that
took place in migrant-sending areas.
One of the things I find interesting is that despite this
phenomenon of a growing labor rights movement in Indonesia
that gathered strength through the mid-1990s, it never actual-
ly turned into a force that solidified across class lines. It tend-
ed to be very narrowly focused on the grievances of specific
industrial estates, even specific factories, and there was very
little identification with the plight of workers elsewhere. Indo-
nesia has 13,000 islands, about 7,000 of which are inhabited,
but the labor movement didn't succeed in building common
cause from Java to Bali, or Java to Sumatra, or from Java to
Sulawasi.
So, when the great economic and political crisis hit this
year, one of the things you didn't see was workers at the fore-
front. Even if they played an important role in helping loosen
up the system in the years that preceded the crisis, they
played a very small role in the changes that took place.
Now, in terms of the causes of the crisis in Indonesia there
is no question that international lending agencies played a
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large role by pressuring Indonesia to open up to international
capital markets without insisting on any kind of regulation or
accountability.
That factor was important, but it wasn't the only one by
any means. It was also the case that the political situation in
Indonesia made it more vulnerable to the effects of economic
crisis. The collapse of the rupiah coincided with a period dur-
ing which political frustration with President Suharto, who
had been in power for thirty-two years, had reached a peak.
Suharto in March 1999 was about to run for--or be appointed
to-a seventh five-year term as president.
What happened was that as the international investor
community lost confidence, and as the rupiah, the currency
collapsed, the political opposition was growing in such a way
that economic turmoil fed off and into political turmoil. The
confidence of investors began to collapse as they saw political
opposition rising in the streets, led by the student movement.
It got to the point where it was impossible to separate out
what was economic and what was political.
International financial institutions like the IMF-whose
policies almost everybody agrees made things worse-began to
focus on political stability as a sine qua non of any kind of
economic reform and that in itself was a very useful develop-
ment.
In terms of the changes that eventually took place, it is
interesting to see how the human rights situation was affected
by the impact of an economic crisis on a long-entrenched dicta-
torship, although a dictatorship of the more moderate variety.
And the crisis was dire: the economy was shrinking by fifteen
percent or twenty percent, you have millions of people out of
work, you have a whole generation of school children who
dropped out because they couldn't afford school fees, and you
even had food distribution networks begin to break down.
Suharto was forced to resign in May, and his hand-picked
protege, President Habibie, took over. There were some human
rights issues that were very easy to fix. Overnight there was
freedom of the press. That was no problem, you can free the
press with the stroke of a pen. Overnight, there was freedom of
association. Workers were allowed to form unions. The number
of political parties went from three to seventy-two parties with-
in the space of three months, and the number continues to
grow.
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The new government wasn't as comfortable about lifting
all restrictions on freedom of assembly, but there was still
more freedom even there than many would ever have thought
possible. Going back to Indonesia after Suharto fell was like
going to a country that you didn't know any longer, because it
was so much more open.
But that was the easy part. The difficult part is to under-
take the structural reforms left over from thirty-two years of
repression in a way that can actually bring about some kind of
useful change and economic recovery at the same time.
First of all you have a legal system in a shambles. It was
always extremely corrupt, and judges are civil servants who
report to the Minister of Justice. There has never been inde-
pendence of the judiciary. Now that there is interest in estab-
lishing the rule of law, the question is, how do you do it?
Secondly, you have the role of the Army which was deeply
entrenched in Indonesia. As it became clear that the army had
been involved in a lot of really nasty abuses, the prestige of the
Army just evaporated. That prestige was largely based on fear,
anyway, but it did just crumble.
And now as the economic crisis continues to deteriorate,
there are more and more outbreaks of social unrest and the
Army is almost afraid to go in and restore law and order, fear-
ing that it will become a target of attacks. (It also may have an
interest in letting civil unrest develop so that a nostalgia de-
velops for the old authoritarianism). In many cases, therefore,
the Army is simply standing by as attacks take place. The
most notable example was the violence, largely against ethnic
Chinese, in Jakarta and other cities in May that helped lead to
Suharto's resignation. Now there are major killings going on in
East Java which seem to be partly perpetrated for political
reasons by rogue elements of the military. The conventional
part of the military is very leery about going in and doing
anything.
The police will probably come under civilian control for the
first time in Indonesia, but there is a huge issue about how
you reform an incredibly corrupt police force and start from
scratch in terms of making it work.
Political parties have sprouted like mushrooms, but most
have no clue about what political parities are supposed to do,
no notion of the whole idea of building alliances and coalitions
and basic functions of representing interest groups.
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The Parliament has been a rubber stamp body for the last
thirty-two years. Now there are going to be elections in June
1999 to get a real representative legislature. How do you cre-
ate a workable legislative branch when there has not been one
since the 1950s? Trying to build up these institutions at a time
of economic crisis and when much of the political elite is still
linked to the ancient regime is a real challenge.
Finally, there is another issue in Indonesia which is in-
creasingly on the agenda with the economic and political crisis:
the whole set of grievances in regions that are resource
rich-oil producing regions, mineral producing regions, timber
producing regions-which produce much of Indonesia's vast
wealth but have received few of the benefits. These provinces
and their governments want to hang on to as much as that
wealth as possible, not send it all to a corrupt elite in Jakarta.
But how do you acknowledge the regional grievances without
exacerbating some of the centrifugal forces in a multi-ethnic
society? How do you manage to avoid addressing some of the
demands for economic autonomy without at the same time
giving rise to political separatist movements?
All of these issues are now on the table in Indonesia. It is
going to be very difficult for any government there to figure
out a formula that will allow democratization and economic
recovery to take place at the same time. Thank you.
RICHARD DICKER
It is always much easier following Sidney, who laid out a
complicated picture in a very clear way. Happily for myself, I
am going to focus on one discreet aspect of the picture. I want
to draw on lessons about corporate social responsibility we
have learned from research we have conducted in various parts
of the world that have real relevance in applicability for a
changing Indonesia.
We see that the greater mobility of capital and its penetra-
tion abroad has had profound human rights consequences in
an overall kind of way. We recognize that corporations, as
private entities, exist to earn profits for their shareholders and
they are not, human rights agencies, but nonetheless we be-
lieve the corporate sector has a duty to avoid involvement in
government human rights violations.
The importance of corporate social responsibility for hu-
man rights has been underscored, not only by the opening of
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markets worldwide and the international, national and local
measures to attract capital investment, but also by the dra-
matic drop in government foreign economic assistance over the
last several years. All of that together serves to highlight the
role that corporations play.
I want to focus in particular on the extractive sector-oil,
mining and natural gas-because in many, many instances
these industries operate across large sections of territory, have
close relationships with military and security forces, and unfor-
tunately are all too often linked with the most serious kinds of
human rights violations.
I want to say at the outset that private-sector entities like
oil corporations are not, strictly speaking, governed by the in-
ternational legal instruments that we in the human rights
movement apply to governments. There is a gap conceptually
and legally in the standards with which we hold corporations
accountable for their actions in Indonesia, in Nigeria and Co-
lombia. At Human Rights Watch we have tried to develop a
responsible theory to fill that gap, this involves the concept of
accomplice liability.
We have seen corporate complicity in Nigeria where corpo-
rations have failed to criticize governmental human rights
abuses occurring when the authorities respond to corporate
requests for security protection. I am thinking, of course, of
Royal Dutch/Shell, which we found to be complicit in human
rights violations in Nigeria when it summoned the security
forces in the Niger Delta to respond to protests against Shell's
environmental policies and practices. Then when those security
forces embarked on a reign of terror against the Ogoni people
in the Niger Delta, Royal Dutch/Shell remained silent.
That series of events culminated in the hanging of Ken
Saro-Wiwa and other activists in the Ogoni movement. It was
the reliance on government security forces which committed
human rights violations, and the silence of the corporation in
the face of those violations, that we found to be an instance of
complicity.
In Colombia we investigated the activities of the British
Petroleum Corporation and the Occidental Petroleum Corpora-
tion which have operated in partnership with the government
petroleum company in a situation that admittedly is very diffi-
cult. There is an armed insurgency targeting the oil company
facilities and personnel, and the companies have relied on a
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human rights violative Colombian Armed Forces for protection.
They have gone beyond simply relying on the Armed Forc-
es of Colombia, they have made direct payments to the Armed
Forces of Colombia for security protection by units of the mili-
tary that have a long track record of human rights violations
and violations of the laws of war. We find those corporations to
be complicit in serious governmental human rights violations.
In both those instances, Nigeria and Colombia, with Royal
Dutch/Shell and British Petroleum, there was a public opinion
firestorm ignited when their relationships with the military
came to light. Those experiences have given both those corpo-
rations cause to think, and I want to credit both of them for
doing a very serious and careful reassessment of their human
rights practices. They are, however, at the very beginning
phase of developing and applying policies that will make a
difference on the ground.
Let me talk about some of the particulars in Indonesia to
underscore the concerns we have about oil company operations
there, and the need for oil companies, particularly Mobil,
which is engaged in widespread natural gas extraction and
natural gas liquefication in the Ottay Region.
Mobil is a large player in Ottay with natural gas
liquefication. There are credible reports that fit the pattern we
have seen in Nigeria, that we've seen in Colombia, where the
company is responsible for environmental degradation -which
has led to social protest and efforts to gain redress for various
forms of environmental degradation that have had a severe
impact on the quality of life and livelihood of the people in the
region.
It is this pattern of environmental degradation, that
sparks social protest, that underscores the need for Mobil,
among other oil companies operating there, to play a different
role vis-a-vis the communities where they operate. This raises
the question I want to focus on in the few minutes I have left.
What kinds of practices and policies can oil companies adopt
that will coincide with and enhance respect for human rights
where they operate? These policies have to be developed in
relationship to specific problems and practices that emerge on
the ground.
First, I want to talk about the kinds of policies in those
situations where there are widespread human rights violations
committed by military forces. Then I will discuss another sce-
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nario where police conduct is the source of the problem.
First and foremost, companies should insert a clause into
any security agreement signed with the government that re-
quires as a condition of contract that the state security forces
operating in the area of company installations conform to the
human rights obligations the government has assumed under
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as
well as other international human rights and humanitarian
treaties.
Where formal arrangements exist between the company
and the state, security agreements with state entities should
be made public. In other words, in instances where there are
agreements, we want those agreements to be transparent ex-
cept for those details that might jeopardize individual security.
We believe companies should insist on screening the military
and police assigned to protect their facilities and personnel in
consultation with the defense ministry and civilian government
agencies in charge of investigating human rights violations.
We believe the companies should make absolutely clear to
police and the military defending them as well as to subcon-
tracting companies, that human rights violations will not be
tolerated.
So, there are a number of specific steps we believe compa-
nies can take in those situations where the stakes are the
highest, where the dangers are the greatest, situations of in-
ternal conflict where the companies are depending on military
forces to protect them and their personnel.
In less intense situations, where the company calls on the
police to provide protection in the face of demonstrations and
protests, we think similar measures can be enacted. In addi-
tion, we believe allegations that contractors the company used
have made threats or have harassed individuals opposed to the
projects, need to be investigated.
We believe high-ranking corporate officials should be ap-
pointed to monitor human rights in that project area and that
those officials require training in human rights issues. We
believe independent verification must take place of allegations
of human rights violations in the area.
Let me conclude by focusing on a few other players that
don't normally receive sufficient attention. For example, in the
United States, entities like the Overseas Private Investment
Corporation is often an important player in providing insur-
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ance for corporations operating abroad. We believe the Over-
seas Private Investment Corporation should make public labor
rights audits that they conduct. We believe the Export/Import
Bank of the United States must verify and make public the
information it considered about extending financing to the
project. We believe the information the Department of State
provided to the Export/Import Bank must also be made public.
In other words, in relation to several different situations
on the ground, there are specific steps that companies can
take, there are specific steps that government agencies can
take that we believe will have an important positive value in
enhancing respect for human rights. Thanks very much.
SPENCER WEBER WALLER
Thank you, very much, Larry. It's really humbling to be
part of this program in a lot of different ways. Judge
Weeramantry and Professor Henkin have been an inspiration
to me and anyone who has worked in any of the fields that we
have touched on today. I am really grateful for their participa-
tion. I am also grateful for everyone that we have heard from
today, particularly everybody from Human Rights Watch.
Now, why me? I probably know less about Indonesia than
a number of people on the panel, and I know I know less about
human rights law than most people in the room. My theory is
the hour is drawing to a close, people know I will speak loudly,
try to be clear and that I will finish on time so that we could
have room for questions and a reception to celebrate the dis-
cussion today.
I do have an interest in competition policy in the United
States and around the world. And I want to make a little pitch
to you that today that we can think of competition policy in a
way and apply it to Indonesia, in a way that we don't think
about it very much anymore in the United States.
We can think about competition policy in a broad sense
and antitrust law in a narrow sense, as a way to control power,
as a way to control private power, a way to control public pow-
er, and as a source of both public interest, democracy, and
freedom and it may extend to the edge of what people conven-
tionally think of as human rights as well.
We haven't thought about antitrust in this way in the
United States for quite some time, but in a historical perspec-
tive it is not that long ago, 1888, that there was an anti-mo-
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nopoly party that ran candidates for president of the United
States and was taken quite seriously.
It is not that long ago that the Republican party and the
Democratic party vied to see who could be the best friend of
antitrust in their political platforms and the legislation that
they sponsored.
Let me just suggest that, as a law about the control of
power, antitrust has great applicability around the world and
it is seen in this revolutionary way in a way that we don't look
at it anymore in the United States.
The countries of the post-Soviet economies see antitrust
and competition policy for their transformative powers to make
their society freer, more democratic, more prosperous, and
more efficient. Sometimes those goals conflict, but more often
they are broadly sympathetic to one another.
The developing countries of the world are finding again
transformative powers in antitrust, sometimes voluntarily and
sometimes involuntarily. Indonesia is a country that has never
been characterized in recent times by anything close to a com-
petitive economy. The injection of a modicum of competition for
both internally and externally driven reasons would be part of
a process of alleviating suffering and misery, increasing democ-
racy, freedom, and opportunity and maybe, I was thinking
about Judge Weeramantry's remarks at lunch, maybe we can
conceive of competition law as part of the successor to the
spiritual constraints that were used to constrain business ac-
tivity and power.
Let me give you three historical examples in addition to
what Judge Weeramantry discussed that illustrate the differ-
ent kinds of relationships that antitrust and competition policy
have had to private and public power and then I will turn
quickly to Indonesia.
One is in Athens, in the Athens of antiquity as democracy
first flourished. In the Seventh Century B.C. a group of corn
dealers, the most important staple of life, were found to have
cornered the market. I don't mean the impersonal market that
we think about today, but literally the market place. They
cornered all the corn, and drove the price up. They were put to
death.
This is the first, the earliest reported antitrust opinion I
have ever been able to find. It is the only known death penalty
involving the area of antitrust and I think an interesting issue
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as we follow the events in Washington and the Microsoft litiga-
tion.
A little later in a very different kind of Greek society,
Aristotle in Politics talked about a different kind of antitrust
and its relationship to democracy. The dictator of Sicily found
that foreign merchants had monopolized the iron ore market
and the penalty was expulsion. The foreigners were thrown out
of the country. This sounds good until you realize that the
dictator of Sicily was primarily offended that foreigners had
monopolized the iron ore market and if anyone was going to do
it, it was going to be him and his cronies and his family, les-
sons for Indonesia, comparison shortly to follow.
Finally to fast-forward to the middle ages, again in the
marketplace, not the impersonal market, people gathered in
England to trade on market days. There were no distribution
systems, there were no dealers or middle men, these were
viewed as parasitic enterprises. The English common-law
strictly forbid anything other than the buying and selling of
people in a sort of face-to-face transaction. There was common
law that barred the cornering of the market and various civil
and criminal penalties applied to the parasitic buying up of
supplies to the detriment of the ultimate consumers.
Well, how do all three of these examples relate to what is
happening in Indonesia and what promise a modestly more
competitive economy could bring?
Indonesia currently has an economy where the worst of all
these examples could be found primarily tied to the family and
the friends of the family of the Suharto regime and now its
successor. This is against a background of a legal system that
had very little elements of anything we would recognize as
competition law or antitrust law.
There is a 1993 state policy guideline that describes mo-
nopoly as inimical to social justice, and I certainly agree with
that, and provided that steps should be taken to guard against
unfair and unhealthy competition. If anything, that has been
perverted into the system that I am going to describe to you.
In addition, the 1995 small scale business law also talked
about competition and assigned the government the task of
promoting policies to cultivate a good business climate for
small firms.
There are a couple of other similar provisions. If you look
through the laws, you can tease out a few other mentions, but
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even if there is technically something we can call competition
law, it exists primarily on paper and free and competitive
markets are largely alien to Indonesia's economy.
When Suharto seized power, many hoped that he would
establish a more free market oriented policy. Indeed, there was
some early evidence that he might have had some interest in
doing so. But quickly the economy became dominated by family
interests and friends of the family. Sort of the MCI friends and
family program for the Indonesian economy.
Let me give you some examples that I find shocking, that
truly impoverish the people at every possible level, and create
misery in a climate in which they lack the material resources
to enjoy some of the most fundamental rights.
Many of you know that the clove industry is a critical part
of the Indonesian economy. In the old days, that is prior to
1990, it was flourishing in a number of senses. The farmers
who grew cloves were being paid pretty well for the crops that
they grew. They sold to primarily local cooperatives or traders
who then stored and dried the cloves. These were not parasitic
functions, but rather valuable distribution functions to get
cloves grown in remote places processed, and then sold eventu-
ally to a combination of spice makers and primarily the clove
cigarette producers.
We had several levels of people whose interests were being
served once you put aside the complicated and depressing
health issues associated with having to talk about the cigarette
industry in this fashion.
Farmers were well off. In fact, the prices were so good that
the farmers were able to buy televisions and refrigerators,
often as status symbols, because in large part there was no
electricity where these crops were being grown. The crops were
sold at good prices to productive dealers and cooperatives who
themselves were small businesses, who were able to then do
the kind of functions that individual farmers couldn't do, turn
around and sell them the dried and processed crops to ciga-
rette producers, spice producers, who in some cases are large
national and multinational businesses, and in other cases, are
smaller more modest scale enterprises. Ultimately, the con-
sumers purchased the items that were produced with the
cloves.
All that changed in 1990, when a clove monopoly was
established by President Suharto. It was created originally as
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a privately run consortium to act as the sole middleman for the
purchase and sale of cloves. The Buffer Stock Agency, known
as the BPPC, was granted this monopoly. Its shareholder is a
consortium of five companies that is controlled by Tommy
Suharto, the former President's son.
Since the time when he took control of the clove industry,
many ordinary farmers have found it impossible to survive,
despite promises that this was all being done for the benefit of
the farmers and the consumers. The BPPC, if anything, used
its monopoly buying power to drive the price down that it paid
to farmers. Not surprisingly, it also drove up the price to the
cigarette companies. It became the only legally sanctioned
entity that could buy or sell cloves, destroying the private run
cooperatives and local traders who had previously done that
productive function.
In the place of a reasonably competitive sector, you have
the most parasitic monopoly, probably worse than anything we
see in most countries, because it doesn't actually make or grow
any of these items. It is solely there as the tollgate that you
have to pay to get the stuff from one end of the economy to the
other.
The changes that have come were not internally led, they
were externally driven. As a formal matter they are disman-
tling the clove monopoly I have described to you. Why are they
doing that? They were forced to do that by the IMF. You will
not be surprised to know that the clove monopoly is mutating
in various ways. It has a tremendous economic incentive to do
so; it is stuck with a large supply of very high priced cloves for
a variety of reasons. Although farmers technically now have
the freedom to sell to anyone they want, the reality is, through
a variety of official and unofficial means, they are still stuck
with having to deal with the newly reincarnated version of the
BPPC. One of the reasons is clove cigarette manufacturers
have to show a proof of purchase certificate in order to get
certain excise tax stickers before they can use the cloves and
right now only the BPPC and its successors have the right to
issue that certificate.
In addition, although farmers can now sell to anyone they
wish, the clove monopoly is saying, if you don't deal with us,
we are going to flood the market with this huge overhang that
we have in our warehouses. The monopoly is hanging on with
all its muscle to distort the economics and politics of this industry.
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This pattern of domination of the distribution and little, if
any, true economic value being added by a monopoly, is also
present in several other key Indonesian industries. I will give
you the shortest description of two others that give some flavor
for the combination of private power and public power that you
confront.
The formal and informal cartel that controlled Indonesia's
plywood export industry was again run by one of the former
President's best friends. This corporate group again does not
produce the plywood and exists as the toll collector for those
who produce it and want to sell it abroad. They have what is
called a statistical research board where exporters have to pay
a fee for every cubic meter of plywood exports and, in fact,
exporters have to use the shipping company of the same indi-
vidual who controls the cartel. Again, no choice, no real value,
other than the extraction of profits from both ends of the trans-
action.
In some cases, there is not even a pretense of this being
done by private enterprise. The Indonesian National Logistics
Board, BULOG, regulated trade and distribution of a wide
variety of commodities that include rice, wheat, sugar, garlic,
and a variety of other staples and represented one of the larg-
est and the most entrenched government monopolies. There
are other state-owned agencies and other state-owned compa-
nies that dominate the vast majority of important industries
including steel and oil. These privileges are being removed
over time with the monopoly entity hanging on for dear life
and mutating into various new forms.
The pressures are coming from primarily outside Indone-
sia. They are coming from the IMF, they are coming from the
World Bank, they are coming from the nations that fund those
agencies. They are coming from other organizations such as
the OECD. None of this would have happened, none of the
pressures that have the potential to make Indonesia economy a
little better off, but for all of those groups that I have men-
tioned. None of those changes would have arisen but for the
globalization of the economy and the liberalization of trade and
investment regimes that gave these agencies and individuals
the incentive and the leverage to force change. It is, if any-
thing, a sort of silver lining of the cloud of the current crises
that Indonesia is both more receptive and simply has less
options to resist these changes.
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How are the changes being made? There are people within
Indonesia who understand the need for a legitimate competi-
tion policy to attempt to control entrenched public and private
power. They are often the elites in the government, but they
are not particularly the high level elites. More frequently, they
are the elite technocrats who have seen how their foreign coun-
terparts address these issues, have been educated in this tradi-
tion, find value and importance in this work, and form the
cadre of what may someday be a reasonably independent Indo-
nesian competition authority that enforces a true antitrust
law. The law is being drafted both with the participation and
the influence of all the national multinational, multilateral,
governmental, and NGO groups who have an interest in these
issues.
This is a large group of people who have played this game
before. They played this game before in Eastern Europe with
the post-Soviet economies. They played this game in Latin
America as those economies opened up to the international
trading system. There are only 100 or so people who do this
work on a regular basis. It is kind of a movable feast. Some-
times you find them in Mongolia, sometimes you find them in
Peru, and sometimes you find them in Indonesia. They are
expert people who are working very hard with their Indonesian
counterparts to craft a law that is simple, clean in terms of
trying to address the problems of competition, and enforceable
in an era where everybody knows whatever agency is going to
be created will have limited funds, limited resources, and will
struggle for political independence in its early years.
There are some striking successes around the world and
some striking issues that have yet to be addressed. If you look
at the work of someone like Bill Kovacic who is a Professor at
George Mason, is heavily involved in these efforts around the
world. He has written terrific articles that explain things we
can barely conceive of. We tend to think of the FTC and the
Justice Department who enforce our laws, have enough money,
have more than adequate expertise and enjoy extensive politi-
cal independence.
In contrast, the issue in Ukraine is, do they have enough
telephones, do they have typewriters? Forget computers, do
they have enough typing paper in Mongolia? In Brazil, will the
agency be funded? Will the forty percent budget cuts that the
rest of the government is going through also affect the sophis-
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ticated competition agency in that country?
How many people does Indonesia need, how much money,
will they have a chance at taking a crack at this kind of en-
trenched power? I don't know the answer. I do think they will
have to take modest steps before they can take on any of the
biggest issues. Let me just suggest that competition policy is a
non-traditional way to think about the issues we have talked
about today. Without being Pollyanish about it, there should
be substantial agreement that the promotion of human dignity
and economic competition are broadly consistent. I wish every-
one involved in that project the best of luck and I thank you
for your time and attention.
AUDIENCE QUESTION
Spencer, I think the other issue that is coming up in Indo-
nesia is surely the competition policy, which is being pushed
on Indonesia by the IMF and the World Bank, they have a law
in place by the end of the year, otherwise they don't get their
next funding. That's what structural adjustment is about, in
addition to having a lot of frankly feminist programs they have
to have in place as well by the end of the year.
But the question I have for you, Spencer, there is some
concern that there is a minority group, a sort of ethnic Chinese
minority group and that a competition policy might be a more
efficient means of burning down the Chinese store? How do
you reflect on that?
MR. WALLER: I think it is a tremendously complicated
issue because as I understand it in the Indonesian economy
Chinese business interests have been closely linked with the
prevailing monopolies and dominant firms and cartels, and I
certainly wouldn't want a system where that unleashes al-
ready-existing ethnic tension aimed at that community.
There are business elites that are often ethnic minority
groups. South Africa is the most obvious one. They are going
through a tremendous struggle that is now adding the competi-
tion element to all the other constitutional and structural
changes that they are going through. To go after their domi-
nant firms, is to go after the Africaaner minority interests that
have run those companies, that are as entrenched as anything
in Indonesia.
So, it is not a unique issue. It is an issue that I don't have
an easy solution for. I will have to defer to those with addition-
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al empirical knowledge which is probably Sidney.
MS. JONES: I just have a quick comment on that. The
Chinese are about four percent of the Indonesian population
and the general estimate is they control about seventy percent
of the retail economy. But it is very important to realize that
the violence that took place against the ethnic Chinese in the
period from January up to the present, was not ordinary vio-
lence, not just an outbreak of social frustration and discrimina-
tion because there has been some anti-Chinese violence in
virtually every outbreak of social unrest in Indonesia, where
Chinese shops get stoned and so on.
The scale of the violence that took place first in January
and February and then in the riots in May was the result of
deliberate organized state violence, and that was confirmed
two days ago in Indonesia in the report of a fact-finding panel.
So, I think that's one thing that has to be distinguished.
Secondly, it is important to recognize that leading mem-
bers of the Chinese community now are saying, yes, we do
need to work out some kind of accommodation with the indige-
nous Muslim entrepreneurs in Indonesia, and maybe one way
to do it would be to take a closer look at the new economic
policy in Malaysia, agree that some kind of affirmative action
for indigenous entrepreneurs is useful and work out programs
that will bring more and more Muslim entrepreneurs into
firms that are now largely Chinese controlled. But at the same
time the Chinese are saying, we need to have our rights, so
that trade is not the only area that we can go into, so that we
are not relegated to one occupation.
MR. WALLER: One other thing. It is perfectly legitimate
for a society in writing a competition law or any other kind of
law to say there are other values that we care about. I think
Indonesia is going to be under some heavy pressure to adopt a
law that looks like the United States or that looks like the
European Union depending on who is doing the speaking and
the selling. I would urge them not to do either. I would urge
them to take a thoughtful and indigenous approach to what
they are trying to accomplish in terms of creating a more com-
petitive economy and if there are any other values that they
think are so important that trump competition and need to be
included either in the competition law itself or in the other
kinds of laws and accommodations that Sidney was referring
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AUDIENCE QUESTION
I have a question for Richard Dicker. I find it interesting
how you were talking about the kinds of solutions we can seek
in terms of corporate accountability and the kinds of things
that you could be asking for. I guess I am curious as to wheth-
er you have tried any of this out, what companies have you
tried to engage it with and what countries? Where is the open-
ness, where are the windows of opportunity there?
MR. DICKER: It is interesting in that there has been a
real movement, and some of you may have seen the article in
the New York Times this morning about the agreement involv-
ing a number of apparel and footwear companies and several
NGOs. What we have seen is an interesting movement from
apparel and footwear to the extractive industries, and I want
to refer specifically to Shell and to British Petroleum. Those
are companies that have, I think seriously wrestled with what
it means to have a human rights policy.
Those companies have taken those steps because they
have been forced to after a storm of public outcry involving
both of them, Shell of course in Nigeria, British Petroleum in
Colombia. I think it reflects an important trend that we are
likely to see more of, but a trend that is really only at its be-
ginning phase. I have characterized that phase as consisting of
the adoption of human rights principles in broad strokes.
My point in answer to the question is, in some ways the
companies have come to us, shopping around, if you will, their
broadly formulated human rights policies or commitments. Our
response to them has been that a good first step, but you have
got to go much beyond that, in terms of developing specific
policies that will address scenarios that you have already
faced. I have to say, we have yet to see that kind of specific
policy and practice develop, and that's why we focused a great
deal of effort in terms of going beyond the general and really
looking at concrete situations and trying to develop approaches
that relate to the precise situations that these companies face
on the ground.
I think we and others have to continue to hold their feet to
the fire to go from the general to the particular because it is
only in the particular that these policies will stand a chance of
making a difference.
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AUDIENCE QUESTION
I wonder if any of the panel members want to comment on
the Freeport case in Louisiana?
MS. JONES: The Freeport McMoran is one of the biggest
gold and copper mining corporations in the world and is the
largest single taxpayer in Indonesia. It is certainly the largest
firm that is in the country, and there are a lot of very interest-
ing things going on. There has been pressure building on
Freeport for the last three years or so to deal with human
rights abuses that have taken place in its contract of work
area, although thus far the abuses have been perpetrated by
the Indonesian military with the help of logistical support from
Freeport. There isn't a smoking gun thus far directly to
Freeport employees.
But the most recent development was that an American
political scientist, together with an Indonesian economist,
charged that the current minister of finance in Indonesia and a
number of other people very closely associated with the current
government had actually benefited from practices in which
Freeport had engaged-whereby it had loaned money to
uncredit-worthy cronies of the Suharto family by giving them
shares of stock which it then bought back after the stock prices
had quadrupled-thereby subsiding the cronies in question.
Each of the cronies was given a project that was directly relat-
ed to operational support of Freeport.
This is actually a very interesting example, first of the
new freedom of the press in Indonesia, because this never ever
would have been covered in the detail it was before May.
Secondly it is an indication of how seriously the Indone-
sian public is taking the corruption issue which is critical to
some kind of accountability. The finance minister has been
called to the police station for investigation. Freeport is going
around now on a major public relations campaign now trying
to explain that what they were really doing was helping the
Indonesian public in a time of crisis and so on. We don't know
what the outcome of it will be but if charges against the senior
ministers in Indonesia and senior cronies stick, that will be a
major development. The unfortunate thing is that they are also
bringing a criminal defamation suit against the two who blew
the whistle.
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That will end the session. I wish I had a parable as good
as the goat story with which the last panel ended. I don't, but I
have two very nice ways to end this session and the Sympo-
sium. First, everyone is invited to a reception and to continue
the discussion. Secondly, I would like to say that the mark of a
good Symposium is that the discussion that it generates is so
stimulating that not only does it keep the attention of the
people here, during the day, but it stimulates all of us to think
about this for a long time to come. This Symposium undoubt-
edly has more than met that standard.
So, I would like to conclude by thanking all the speakers
for a very exciting day. And I would also like to thank all those
who organized this conference here at Brooklyn Law School
from the members of the Committee and the Dean to all the
students who participated. Professor Sam Murumba should
certainly be given a special note of gratitude for all his efforts.
Thank you all.
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